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Who needs solidarity? 
 
‘It is not difficult to identify what should be the core values of a party that belongs to 
the family of modern European social democracy.  Top of anyone’s list must come 
solidarity – the principle that the strength of a society is measured by the extent that 
its rich members support vulnerable fellow citizens.   Next comes the commitment to 
humanitarian rather than commercial priorities, and its corollary that the market 
should be managed to meet people’s needs rather than the people harnessed to serve 
the market’ (Robin Cook, Guardian Feb 4, 2005)  
 
‘[European integration]…ist nicht der Weltfriede, nicht die Abrüstung und nicht die 
Erschlaffung, aber es ist Milderung der Konflikte, Kräfteersparnis und solidarische 
Zivilisation’ (Walther Rathenau, cited in Beck 1997) 
 
 
The term solidarity is of course a central element of the Marxist and, more 
broadly, socialist tradition, and of the work of Emile Durkheim, who established its 
use in the late nineteenth century as a theoretical category of the emergent discipline 
of sociology.  Writing against the background of a political doctrine known as 
solidarism
1
, which dominated French political thinking in the second half of the 
nineteenth century (Zeldin, 1973, ch. 21), Durkheim devoted his first major work, 
on The Division of Labour in Society (1895) to an ambitious contrast between the 
‘mechanical solidarity’ of simple societies, based on their homogeneity, and the 
organic solidarity of more complex and differentiated societies, based on the mutual 
dependence of individuals.   
 
There is, then, a broad concept of social solidarity, which makes it equivalent to an 
answer to the question ‘how is society or social order possible?’. The Durkheimian 
tradition, influenced by late nineteenth century solidarism, claims that it is central, 
while an economistic tradition says it is not.  In his lectures on social solidarity at 
Bordeaux in 1887 Durkheim described the problem of sociology as being: ‘What are 
the bonds that unite men to one another, that so to speak determine the formation of 
 2 
social aggregates?’2  In David Lockwood’s Solidarity and Schism , which is 
concerned with the problem of social order in the work of  Durkheim and Marx,  
solidarity represents the limit case ‘where there is widespread conformity with, and 
internalization of, the normative expectations attaching to the  roles making up 
institutions.’ (Lockwood, 2002: 12).3 
 
Claus Offe (2000), at the beginning of a rather pessimistic analysis of the state 
of contemporary postcommunst societies, provides a similarly broad account of 
solidarity as a global feature of well functioning societies:  
 
The “horizontal” phenomena of trust and solidarity (linking citizens to each 
other) are preconditions for the “vertical” phenomenon of the establishment 
and continued existence of state authority, manifested in effectively ensuring 
the performance of civic duties. In simple terms, this means that before 
citizens can recognize the authority of the state, they must first mutually 
recognize each other as being motivated by – and hence reciprocally worthy of 
– trust and solidarity. It is precisely when this abstract but resilient trust in 
“everyone else” as the collective co-author of the obligating norms is 
undermined, or when citizens’ active interest in each other’s well-being is 
successfully discredited that liberal notions about curtailing the scope of the 
state’s authority flourish. Trust in one’s fellow citizens provides the cognitive 
and moral foundations for democracy, the risks of which no one would 
reasonably accept otherwise. The solidarity citizens feel toward one another, 
or to which they allow themselves to be obligated through their representative 
institutions, is the moral basis of the welfare state. Thus, both democracy and 
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the welfare state are dependent upon the prior existence of binding motives, 
which in turn are tied to the form of political integration found in the nation-
state. 
 
Some commentators, like Offe, would see solidarity as the source and 
animating spirit of the European welfare state or, more broadly, social model.  For 
Hartmut Kaelble, in Kaelble and Schmidt (2004): 40-1:  
 
Durch die Herausbildung des modernen Wohlfahrtsstaats erhielt der 
europäische Nationalstaat eine neue Legitimation.  Neue Bürgerpflichten, die 
Solidarbeiträge für die Sozialversicherungen, entstanden ebenso wie neue 
Bürgerrechte auf wohlfahrtsstaatliche Leistungen.  Eine nationale Solidarität 
zwischen Erwerbstätigen und Alten, zwischen Gesunden und Kranken, 
zwischen Arbeitenden und Arbeitslosen wurde auf diese Art 
festgeschrieben…Der Wohlfahrtsstaat hat die damals diskreditierten 
Nationalstaaten in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts in einer Weise 
stabilisiert, wie es vor einem halben Jahrhundert kaum vorstellbar war. 
 
As Joe Weiler (2002: 569-70) puts it ‘Europe prides itself on a tradition of social 
solidarity which found political and legal expression in the post-war welfare state.’4   
 Others however would see state-supported welfare policy as a substitute for 
solidarity, as much as for uncoordinated acts of private charity).  More technical and 
policy-oriented discussions of the welfare state tend to avoid the term solidarity, 
while more reflective commentators often use it as a way of marking out certain 
forms of welfare state from others.  The historian Peter Baldwin (1990), discussed in 
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more detail below, differentiates between solidaristic, i.e. redistributive, and more 
limited welfare systems, while Walter Streeck (1999) conceptualises the EU’s 
developing social model as ‘productivist-competitive solidarity’. 5 
Durkheim differed from orthodox economic theory, Herbert Spencer’s 
sociology and Hayek’s later notion of catallaxy in arguing that this solidarity was 
not an automatic product of self-legitimating commercial exchanges. Rather it was 
grounded in deeper moral sentiments and ties reaching ‘far beyond the short 
moments during which exchange is made’ (Durkheim, 1984: 227; Ray, 1999: 97, 
Crow, 2002:12ff).  Durkheim’s main interest was to develop this view against 
utilitarian and contract theories (such as Spencer) on the one hand and Marxist 
materialism on the other. Solidarism was connected in complicated ways to the 
politics of mutual aid, friendly societies and what became the welfare state.  The 
Durkheimian tradition, like Marxism, was not particularly enthusiastic about the 
welfare state.  For the Durkheimians, the welfare state cannot be an adequate 
solution since it does not assure the necessary moral and social integration, but on 
the contrary weakens the integrative functions of intermediate structures; by 
inflating expectations, it promotes anomic tendencies, and by individualising 
benefits it encourages “selfish “ tendencies in our societies’ (Flora, 1981: 363).  
The European welfare state, from its beginnings in the late nineteenth century, 
had been in large part an oblique answer to ‘the social question’, responding to 
political demands for democracy and/or socialism with the consolation prize of 
welfare regimes.  Bismarck’s social legislation of the 1880s was initiated in the 
middle of a twenty-year period during which the socialist party was banned. In 
democratic France, in the aftermath of the 1848 revolutions, conflicts such as that 
over the ‘right to work’ pointed up potential challenges to the state.  As Tocqueville 
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pointed out, this would entail, if taken seriously, that the state either itself become an 
employer or that it impose rigid controls on independent entrepreneurs (Donzelot 
1984: 44).  The question, then, for the Republic, was how to give rights to those 
whose social condition did not match their political status, ‘without these rights 
giving them rights against the state’ (p.71).  As Donzelot argues, it was the rise of 
the social sector with social legislation, an ideology of solidarity and an 
institutionalised practice of negotiation, which answered these dilemmas.  Similarly 
in Britain, the more protracted development of social policy legislation, from the 
restriction of night work for children in 1802 to the full-fledged post WW2 welfare 
state, was in part a response to the challenge of radical democrats inspired by the 
French Revolution or, later, socialists radicalised by the two world wars.  ‘Initially, 
the policy of integration was directed exclusively at the working class, whose 
militancy against the system was to be restrained and channelled...’(Flora, 1981: 
343). In France, in particular, ‘solidarity’ has been the organising slogan for social 
policy, and to some extent for state ideology as a whole, from the late nineteenth 
century to the present
6
.       
The French expert Pierre Rosenvallon, whose book on the crisis of the welfare 
state was a fundamental contribution to discussion in the 1980s, continues to frame 
the issues in terms of solidarity.  Foreshadowed by Leibniz at the end of the 17C, the 
principle of social insurance, ‘acting as a sort of invisible hand of solidarity’, becomes 




  centuries another way of conceptualising the ‘lien social’, 
along with contact and the market (Rosenvallon, 1995: 19). Over time the notion of 
insurance is superseded by more explicitly solidaristic forms of welfare provision 
(p.45,49), culminating in recent attempts in Europe to act directly on the social 
relations of individuals through programmes encouraging self-reliance, healthy living, 
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‘family preservation’ and so on. Here the solidarity represented by the state 
complements, incorporates and acts through ‘local and family solidarities’ (pp. 215-
6).  For Rosenvallon (p. 223), this demands a rethinking of politics: ‘C’est seulement 
du sein d’une vision approfondie de la démocratie et d’une redéfinition lucide de 
l’idée réformiste que peut prendre naissance une pratique elle-même renouvelée de la 
solidarité.   For Rosenvallon (p.49), then, a political conception of the welfare state 
goes alongside a more technical or institutional one.   
 
…il y a deux histoires possibles de l’État-providence. D’un côté une histoire 
institutionnelle, fondée sur l’analyse de l’application des techniques 
assurancielles au domaine social et de leur extension.  De l’autre, une histoire 
philosophique,  articulée autour de la notion de citoyenneté, mettant en rapport 
les droits sociaux avec la dette que l’État contracte envers les individus. 
 
While it is fairly clear what Rosenvallon understands by solidarity, it is 
interesting that the only explicit definition he provides is one formulated in terms of 
practice rather than sentiment:  
 
On peut en effet très schématiquement définir la solidarité comme une forme 
de compensation des différences. Elle se caractérise donc par une action 
positive de partage (pp. 56-7). 
 
Fine, one might say, but what is explicitly solidaristic in this process of redistribution, 
especially if it is, as he assumes, coordinated by the state?  Would not utilitarianism 
and the principle of marginal utility underwrite such a policy – not to mention the sort 
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of concerns for the healthy state of the ‘nation’ or ‘Volk’ which tend to motivate 
social policy innovations in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century?  
It is considerations of this kind which Peter Baldwin (1990) makes the focus 
of his detailed comparison of welfare systems in five European countries in the 
century from 1875 to 1975:  
Not all, in fact very little, social policy has been solidaristic.  Welfare states 
have varied much in this respect.  Where their nature was determined by elites 
who were still persuaded that self-reliance was feasible, redistribution was 
restricted. (21) 
The welfare state raised the possibility of equality in the real terms of risk 
redistribution, the possibility of solidarity.  Only some welfare states have 
gone significantly beyond the levels of social policy necessitated by economic 
optimality and basic political legitimacy to achieve a degree of redistribution 
that speaks as much to the needs of the least fortunate as to the fears of the 
better-off.  How such solidarity was possible is the concern of this book. (7)
7
 
Solidarity, for Baldwin, is attributed to policies rather than to individual or collective 
sentiments.   
Solidarity – the group’s decision to allocate resources by need – is only 
misleadingly analogous to altruism.  An individual sentiment, altruism is 
generally confined to narrow circles of the like-minded.  Solidarity, I those 
few instances where it has been realized, has been the outcome of a 
generalized and reciprocal self-interest.  Not ethics, but politics explain it.  
(299) 
Whether or not Baldwin is right in his explanation of the historical 
development of what he calls solidaristic welfare states,
8
 his book usefully marks out 
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one of the distinctions which I wish to explore here, between solidarity as a sentiment, 
which may be grounded in sympathy, a kind of souffrance à distance (Boltanski, ,tr. 
1999) and/or in a feeling of commonality or ‘we’ness.9    
 
 Even in Durkheim, it may be possible to demonstrate a tension between his 
conceptions of solidarity.  In the original model of the Division of Labour, there is 
already the contrast between the ‘warm’ solidarity based on similarity and the cooler 
organic solidarity based on interdependence; this is reflected in Durkheim’s somewhat 
vague remarks about changing states of the conscience commune. In his preface to the 
second edition, he writes at length about an institutional recommendation: the famous 
occupational corporations.  These are of course at the heart of his lectures first 
delivered in the 1890s but posthumously published in English as Professional Ethics 
and Civic Morals, in which the term ‘solidarity’ does not appear.  It may seem that in 
theorising about social order, institutions increasingly substitute for sentiments in  
Durkheim’s analysis.10  On the other hand, in this same work, and in other, later 
works, we find him emphasising the importance of collective sentiments as a common 
source of conceptions of charity and justice (pp.218ff).   
 
To us it does not seem equitable that a man should be better treated as a social 
being because he was born of parentage that is rich or of high rank.  But is it 
any more equitable that he should be better treated because he was born of a 
father of higher intelligence or in a more favourable moral milieu?  It is here 
that the domain of charity begins.  Charity is the feeling of human sympathy 
that we see becoming clear even of any special merit in gifts or mental 
capacity acquired by heredity.  This, then, is the very acme of justice.  It is 
society, we find, that is coming to exercise complete dominion over nature, to 
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lay down the law for it and to set this moral equality over physical inequality 
which in fact is inherent in things. (220) 
 
A similar conception can be found in a lecture given early in 1914, quoted by Jean-
Claude Filloux (1993:225):  
  
We aspire to a higher form of justice…All that matters is to feel beneath the 
moral coldness which reigns upon the surface of our collective life, the 
sources of warmth which our societies bear within them  
 
It is ideas of this kind that led Mike Gane (1992) to speak of ‘the radical sociology of 
Durkheim and Mauss’, expressed in their conception of socialism and professional 
corporations.  For Durkheim, these must  
 
be genuinely interdependent in two vital senses: they possess a high degree of 
relative autonomy and internal moral solidarity, but, crucially, coming 
together within the limits of a real unity. It is only the intervention of the latter 
which prevents the internal political form of the corporation from degenerating 
into despotism and the abnormal forms of the division of labour on the one 
hand, or being incorporated into the state on the other. (Gane, 1992: 149-50)    
 
Mauss’ socialism was more explicit, and his conception of solidarity correspondingly 
closer to an orthodox socialist one:  ‘le syndicat et la cooperative socialiste sont les 
fondements de la société future.   The Belgian cooperatives were ‘une oeuvre de la 
solidarité ouvrière et populaire’.  
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…we must first of all organise the cooperative into an enormous bloc of 
consumers.  When we have succeeded in creating huge co-operative 
workshops, models of communist production; when we have succeeded in 
invading the various branches of production in every way…when we have 
succeeded in creating, by means of a whole level of institutions of solidarity, a 
close union between all the members of the workers’ cooperatives; when we 
have succeeded in establishing our relationship with the various workers’ 
organisations…then we could contemplate organising ourselves completely on 
an international basis: to join ourselves into a federation for administering 
together wealth which will have become the wealth of a universal proletariat. 
(Quoted by Gane, 1992: 140-1)   
What remains of solidarity in the Marxist and more broadly socialist tradition?  The 
word remains, as in the quotation from the late Robin Cook at the beginning of this 
chapter, but Cook’s depreciation of the market in this quotation puts him outside the 
New Labour orthodoxy, in which the market is primary and solidarity appears more as 
an optional extra, present in a muted form as in Giddens’ defence of the Third Way:  
Third way politics…aims to empower people: ‘to help citizens plot their way 
through the major revolutions of our time: globalization, transformations in 
personal life and our relationship to nature’ Giddens, 1998: 64). [And while] 
‘Third way politics should preserve a core concern with social justice’ (p.65), 
[these issues] ‘are not about social justice, but about how we should live after 
the decline of tradition and custom, how to recreate social solidarity and how to 
react to ecological problems (p.67).  
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 One thinker in the broadly conceived Marxist tradition who  deserves 
particular attention here is Jürgen Habermas. Peter Dews’ excellent collection of 
interviews with Habermas has the title Autonomy and Solidarity.   The autonomy 
theme is of course self-explanatory in Habermas’s thought, which is centrally 
concerned with the autonomous use of reason, but less attention has been paid to the 
importance of notions of solidarity in his thinking.   
 
A lecture from 1984, reprinted in Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik though not in the 
English version, Justification and Application, has the title ‘Justice and Solidarity. On 
the Discussion of <stage 6>’. 11 This  somewhat coded title refers to the psychologist 
Lawrence Kohlberg’s model of moral development, in which individuals advance 
from conventional to more reflective conceptions. For a summary see McCarthy 
(1978) and Outhwaite (1994): 52-3. Habermas was attracted  by  Kohlberg's idea  of  
a complementary relationship between the  psychological  claim that "individuals 
prefer the highest stage of reasoning they comprehend, a claim supported by research" 
and the "philosophical claim that a later stage  is  'objectively' preferable or more 
adequate  by  certain  moral criteria"; this view of the interrelationship between 
philosophy and science is one which Habermas has advanced at various times.  But he 
concedes  that  even  if empirical psychology restricts  the  choice  of acceptable  
moral  theories  to  those which  are  consistent  with  the psychological  evidence, the 
choice between competing ethics "has to  be settled with another kind of argument". 
The  problem can be avoided, Habermas suggests, by  dropping  the idea  of 
successive stages of post-conventional morality.  Taking  up  a suggestion  made by 
McCarthy, Habermas agrees that we should  treat  the moral  reasoning  of post-
conventional subjects as on a level  with  the metatheoretical  disagreements  of moral 
philosophers:  the  oppositions between  utilitarianism,  contract theory, and so on.    
In relation to stage 6, Habermas argues that an ethics of justice, criticised, as it has 
been, for sharing ‘the narrow perspective of the civil intercourse of bourgeois subjects 
of private law’  (p.62),   needs to be augmented not, as Rawls had suggested, with 
benevolence or other aspects of private morality, but by solidarity, where justice and 
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solidarity are seen not as two complementary moments but as ‘two aspects of the 
same thing’ (p.70).  
 
From a communication-theoretical perspective there is...a close connection 
between concern for the good of one’s neighbour and an interest in the common 
good: the identity of the group reproduces itself by means of intact relations of 
reciprocal recognition.  Thus the complementary perspective to individual equal 
treatment is not benevolence but solidarity...  
 
Justice refers to the equal freedoms of unrepresentable and and self-determining 
individuals, whereas solidarity refers to the good of the good of the consociates 
(Genossen) united in an intersubjectively shared form of life – and therefore to 
the preservation of the integrity of this form of life itself...  
 
As a component of a universalistic morality solidarity loses its merely particular 
meaning, limited to the internal relations of a collective which closes itself off 
ethnocentrically from other groups...Postconventionally conceived justice can 
only converge with solidarity as its other when this is transformed in the light of 
the idea of a universal collective process of will formation...   
 
It is above all in the reciprocal recognition of accountable subjects, who orient 
their action to validity claims, that that the ideas of justice and solidarity 
become real (gegenwärtig). But these normative obligations do not of 
themselves extend beyond the boundaries of a concrete lifeworld of family, 
tribe, town or nation.  These limits can only be broken through in discourses, so 
far as these are institutionalised in modern societies. (p.71)  
 
This passage prefigures much of Habermas’ subsequent formal work on morality, law 
and democracy and their subsequent extension to a cosmopolitan or postnational 




Between Facts and Norms and the related texts written immediately before 
and after it constitute Habermas’s attempt to answer the often-posed question of the 
implications of his theory of discourse ethics for politics. Twenty-five years on, he 
starts from the issue which had preoccupied him in the early 1960s in Theory and 
Practice. His Tanner Lectures on Human Values, delivered in 1986, are entitled 'Law 
and Morality', and attempt to reconstruct the traditional concept of the Rechtsstaat, a 
state embodying the rule of law, in terms of the underlying question how legal forms 
of state authority can be legitimate.   Max Weber had a short answer to this question:  
"it is the rationality inherent in the juridical form itself which provided legitimacy for 
domination exercised in legal forms". 1  But Weber's value-free concepts of 
rationality and of legitimacy are too impoverished, as is shown by the difficulty he 
has in giving an adequate account of the intrusion of substantive considerations, such 
as those of welfare, into an, in principle, formal system of law.  Weber saw this 
process as an adulteration of the formal rationality of the legal system.  As with 
economic systems, the choice at the margin between the pursuit of formal and 
substantive rationality is ultimately a matter of arbitrary decision.  For Habermas, by 
contrast, such "collisions" between the conflicting principles of substantive 
considerations of social justice on the one hand, and the formal precision, and 
therefore calculability of the law on the other, "must then be decided from the moral 
point of view of the universalizability of interests" (F&G, p. 547) 
It is not, he stresses, a matter of just extending morality into law or complementing it 
with law in order to give it teeth – an interpretation suggested by McCarthy and by 
Habermas himself in fn 14 of the essay cited in the previous section (see also F&G 
145 and ‘Remarks on Discourse Ethics’, Justification and Application section 11.).  
Rather, law and morality must be treated as two aspects of the same principles, in 
both sociological and philosophical or logical terms.  
a) Sociologically, he points out that:   
In the controversies which since the 17
th
 century we have continually conducted 
over the legal constitution of the political community, there is also expressed a 
moral-practical self-understanding of modernity as a whole. This is expressed 
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equally in the testimony for universalistic moral consciousness and in the free 
institutions of the democratic constitutional state. (F&G 11)  
 
b) Philosophically, the link is made by that between postconventional morality, as 
reconstructed in Habermas’s discourse principle (F&G 138, BFN 106ff), and 
postconventional politics.   
 
We must not understand basic rights or Grundrechte, which take the shape of 
constitutional norms, as mere imitations of moral rights, and we must not take 
political autonomy as a mere copy of moral auonomy. Rather, norms of action 
branch out into moral and legal rules. 
 
 The discourse principle, Habermas stresses,  
 
lies at a level of abstraction that is still neutral with respect to morality and law, 
for it refers to action norms in general:  
 
(D)  just those action norms are valid to which all possibly affected persons 
could agree as participants in rational discourses.  
 
Law, Habermas argues, is both a system of knowledge and a system of action (F&G 
106).  The tension between facticity and validity in legal discourse and practice, 
Habermas believes,  is ultimately resolved through democracy (F&G 13), the idea 
‘that in the sign of a fully secularised politics the constitutional state cannot exist or 
be preserved without radical democracy’ (F&G 13). However, this tension continues 
to be reflected in an ambiguous social context, characterised by  
a) The eclipse of socialism, both as a concrete political project and (in Habermas’s 
preferred broader formulation) as representing the democratic self-organisation of a 
legally constituted community (Rechtsgemeinschaft).  
b) a triumphalist capitalism which endangers the social solidarity expressed inter alia 
in law (F&G 52)  
c) the complexity of modern societies, with the result that models of state and society 
have become problematic (F&G 15).  
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Thus modern law, which treats the addressees of law as also its originators, can be 
seen in ideal terms as living off and reinforcing ‘a solidarity which is concentrated in 
the role of the citizen and ultimately derives from communicative action’ (F&G 52). 
From a sociological or of course from a critical legal studies point of view, this is 
problematic, as Habermas recognises:  
 
The tension between the idealism of constitutional law and the materialism of a 
legal order, particularly of economic law, which merely reflects the unequal 
distribution of social power, finds its echo in the way philosophical and 
empirical approaches to law tend to drift apart.  
 
Habermas recognises, then, though perhaps not quite as fully as some of us might 
wish, that in offering this analysis he is engaged in a delicate balancing act. More 
importantly, modern societies also are.  On the one hand there is the expansion of 
communicative action, human rights discourse, democracy; on the other the 
degradation of natural environments, welfare states, political debate etc. This matters 
particularly to Habermas’ analysis because it relies crucially on the mutual support of 
law, morality democracy, public opinion, civil society and so on, without an easy 
prospect of weaknesses in one area being compensated by strengths in another.  All 
this indicates a further tension between universalistic principles and realms of 
discourse which, in the case of moral discourse, point towards a community of word 
citizens, and the sense that these can only be articulated and made real in bounded 
constitutional states.  F&G 165, with its invocation of a ‘the initiatives of a population 
accustomed to freedom’, whose ‘spontaneity regenerates itself from free traditions 
and preserves itself in the associational relations of a liberal political culture, suggests 
a state-based model, and this is as far as Habermas goes, I think, at this time (1992).  
At the same time, however, he was of course very sensitive to the kinds of issues 
raised by David Held and other theorists of cosmopolitan democracy, and this has 
come to dominate much of his more recent work, notably The Postnational 
Constellation and The Inclusion of the Other.  In the Preface to the latter he declares 
his ‘interest in the question of what conclusions can still be drawn from the 
universalistic content of republican principles, in particular for pluralistic societies in 
which multicultural conflicts are becoming more acute, for nation-states that are 
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coalescing into supranational units, and for the citizens of a world society who have 
been drawn unbeknownst to themselves into an involuntary risk society’.  
 
 
This approach, which Habermas has of course mobilised in favour of notions  
European civil society independent of a concretistically conceived European people, a 
Staatsvolk, also makes models of world civil society or public opinion perhaps less 
incredible.  Habermas certainly wants to move beyond the nation-state in his thinking 
and his practical proposals, eg for European federalism, conceived as ‘Europe’s 
second chance’ to offer the world an attractive political model and as a first stage or 






. Joas (1993: 238-9) offers a Habermasian reading of Durkheim, in which the division 
of labour results from ‘a morality of cooperation’:  
If…only just rules fulfill Durkheim’s conception of organic solidarity, his 
concept of the division of labor is intrinsically bound to his notions of 
justice...Organic solidarity would then be a type of morality which arises in 
the participants by means of an act of reflection on the universal conditions of 
their cooperation.  
This is an attractive reading, but one which I think makes Durkheim look too much 
like a pragmatist. 
 
We are left, then, with something like the following list of partially 
overlapping and partially conflicting usages of the term solidarity; the letters denote 
relations of opposition on the same issue.   
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1a) Solidarity is a fundamental condition of social order (Durkheim, Offe?)  
1b) Solidarity is either unnecessary to, or is a by-product of, self-legitimating market 
exchanges (Spencer, economic theory, Hayek) 
1c) Solidarity is an ideal limit case of social order. 
 
2a) Solidarity is the fundamental source or animating spirit of welfare policies 
(Kaelble). 
2b) Solidarity like charity, is rendered unnecessary by welfare policies in 
differentiated modern societies. 
2c) Solidarity accompanies or animates some, but not all, social welfare policies 
(Baldwin).   
3a) Solidarity is fundamental to class action (most Marxism, Habermas) 
3b) Solidarity is irrelevant to, or a by-product of, class action explained in terms of 
individual rationality (rational choice Marxism)  
4a) Solidarity refers to practices of various kinds. 
4b) Solidarity refers to orientations of various kinds. 
 
‘Solidarity’ is, then, poised between a generalised sentiment, something like 
altruism though more specific, and a set of redistributive or insurance-like practices.  
These may however be linked, rather as in the British Labour Party’s ill-fated ‘ethical 
foreign policy’, which was finally discredited with the 2003 attack on Iraq.  The 
variable geometry of solidarity may in fact be seen as a virtue, in that it can be used to 
bridge the gap between sentiment and action, specificity and diffuseness.  I can feel 
solidarity with a close friend or colleague, but also with distant earthquake victims, 
for whom the practical expression of my solidarity is likely to be highly mediated.  
This flexibility will indeed be particularly advantageous in cases of transnational 
solidarity, such as that across the boundaries of European states, where the 
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conventional ideological and factual (e.g. fiscal) reinforcements may be lacking. I 
cannot plausibly demand that support paid for by my taxes go only to residents of the 
South-East of England, but I might join a pressure group against the extension of 
transfer payments to poorer parts of the EU or against an increase in development aid.  
The failure of the EU to Europeanise social policy is no doubt substantially driven by 
a fear that large numbers of citizens might indeed resist such an initiative.  
 
neither r fidffce, nor sameness.
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Claus Offe’s pessimistic assessment, formulated at the beginning of the 90s rather 
than at their end, but one which many, including perhaps their author, would still 
advance, sees a situation characterised by the weakness of social democratic political 
forces on the one hand, and on the other an ‘associational wilderness which ...must 
today be described as a pluralist-syndicalist-populist hybrid that is a far cry from 
Western European patterns..’ Such conditions, Offe (1996: 240-1) points out, form 
‘the worst possible structural background for the emergence of social policies and 
social policy institutions.’  In a somewhat less negative vein, Graham Crow (2002), 
whose book on Social Solidarities includes a useful discussion of Solidarność in 
Poland, looks comparatively at the problems of social solidarity in what he calls 
‘unsettled societies’, including those in post-communist Europe.  His analysis, 
following Beck, of the decline of traditional solidarities and their replacement by 
more contingent and chosen ones (a shift which, in terms of classical social theory, 
could be compared with that from Tonnies’ ‘Gemeinschaft’ to Schmalenbach’s 
‘Bund’ or voluntary association) has particular relvance to the post-communist 
condition, where old solidarities resulting from a shared condition, a widely shared, if 
more rarely openly expressed,  opposition to the system, and mutual aid with the 
necessities of life in a shortage economy have lost their relevance.  
Let us look a little more closely at the notions of social and political solidarity.  
In political theory, it has become standard to contrast liberal with republican and 
communitarian conceptions of the political community.  In liberal thinking, political 
legitimacy arises directly out of the self-interest of the individual members of society 
who support economic, social and political institutions which enable them to fulfil 
themselves in more or less noble ways. It is not the job of the state or the political 
community to judge between alternative methods of self-fulfilment, so far as these are 
legal.  In communitarian thought, political legitimacy derives out of the substantive 
will, to paraphrase Tonnies’ account of Gemeinschaft, of a real and vibrant human 
community.  In republican conceptions, by contrast, such as that of Hannah Arendt, 
the political community is seen in more voluntaristic terms as in some sense self-
constituting, formulating its own substantive goals in an active process of collective 
will-formation. (This division is parallelled in nationalist discourse between 
economically based theories of nationalism, seeking the best political shell for 
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individual or collective prosperity, and   more explicitly nationalist theories of an 
ethnic or civic form, respectively). 
This, however, is a difference of emphasis. No plausible theory of political 
legitimacy, whether normative or, as in the example cited below, empirical, can avoid 
some reference to the notion of solidarity. As  
 
The unclear relations between the EU’s own development aid and that provided 
unilaterally by member states, and the somewhat incoherent attempts to justify 
European aid (see Karagiannis, 2004) are further examples of this.  The replication of 
even a rather cold, Bismarckian welfare state on a European level seems both essential 
and unlikely – unless, that is, it achieves the mobilization of bias (Bachrach and Baratz 
1970) in the same way that the Common Agricultural Policy, substantially supported 
by farmers, was grudgingly accepted by urban Europeans.  In Scharpf’s view, a 
Europeanization of social policy is unfeasible, and the best alternative is a legal 
framework setting minimum standards for member states, and  
This is, of course, to assume that solidarity, even if intangible, is important.  An 
alternative view would be that what counts are systematically interlinked mechanisms 
which secure the same outcome, just as markets may be understood as more or less 
closely simulating genuinely social production for socially agreed needs via the 
operation of the individual profit motive. System integration, in other words, matters 
more than social integration.  Many aspects of the development of modern societies 
may be seen to support this latter view. On the other hand, there are also increasing 
demands for what Habermas would call communicative justification of societal 
policies. The European Union, like the national states which gave birth to it, started off 
as, and is still an elite project, marked by a ‘democratic deficit (Marquand 1979, Mény 
2002); it remains to be seen whether it can grow the sort of roots which national states 
were able to stimulate or simulate through banal (Billig 1995) and not so banal 
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1
 Solidarité was to be diffused through the educational system promoting social justice 
as repayment of a ‘social debt’ by the privileged to the underprivileged. This 
assumed mutual interdependence and quasi-contractual obligations between all 
citizens and implied a programme of public education, social insurance and labour 
and welfare legislation. Solidarism advocated state intervention, social legislation, 
and voluntary associations to create a middle way between laissez-faire liberalism 
and revolutionary socialism. Durkheim shared the desire for social solidarity 
through reconciliation but believed in more thorough social reconstruction than 
voluntary associations. (Lukes 1973:350-4) 
2
 ‘Introduction à la sociologie de la famille’, quoted by Howard Andrews (1993: 116).  
Sociologists have subsequently learned from David Lockwood’s path-breaking article 
of 1964 to conceptualise this issue in terns of social versus system integration.  
See also Lockwood, 1992  where solidarity represents the . 
3
  He later cites De Grazia (1948; 4), for whom ‘solidarité…[is]…the expression 
Durkheim used to designate the perfect integration of a society with clear-cut values 
that define the status of each member of the community.’(Lockwood: 2002: 66n.).  
Lockwood suggests, following Parsons, that Durkheim’s conception of organic 
solidarity is ‘…unacceptable, because the fact of the interdpendence of functions, 
from which the moral rules regulating this interdependence are supposed 
spontaneously to arise, is in itself just as likely to eventuate in conflict as in 
solidarity’.  In particular, it may give rise, à la Marx, to conflict between opposed 
classes solidaristic only within themselves.   
4
 He goes on to say that...‘the consensus around the classical welfare state is no longer 
as solid as before’.  
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5
 In a rather different vein Bo Rothstein (2001: 223, 226) uses the term solidaristic to 
describe the behaviour of those who contribute to or use benefits; here it means 
something like refraining from free-riding (in the former case) or fraud (in the 
latter).  
6
 This is marked, for example, in the current title of the ‘Ministère des affaires 
sociales, du travail et de la solidarité’. 
7
 Baldwin’s answer, in a word, is that solidaristic or seriously redistributive emerged 
in Scandinavia and Britain, and much later in France and Germany, where not just 
the working class but middle class groups came round to the idea. ‘In many cases, 
solidarity – a more inclusive risk community, a wider and fairer spreading of social 
costs – was realized only when sufficiently powerful social groups among those 
who, in other respects were favored also saw their interests thus to be safeguarded. 
By themselves, the needy have rarely won significant advantage. Only when risk, 
redistributive advantage and political clout coincided was solidarity possible.’ (42)  
8
 There is prima facie something odd about defining altruism as an exclusively 
individual predicate, whereas one might expect it to be at least susceptible of 
imitation and contagion, if not a more genuinely collective sentiment.  
9
 One of the most useful explicit definitions of solidarity is that by the anthropologist 
M. Llewelyn-Davies (1978: 206, quoted in Crow, 2002: 6): ‘a commitment to some 
kind of mutual aid or support, based upon the perception, by those who are solidary, 
that they share certain characteristics, or that they are equal with respect to some 
social principle’. 
10
 One conjecture would be that Durkheim came to see the notion of solidarity as too 
specific, and suggesting a psychological basis of a social phenomenon of the kind he 
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had excluded in The Rules of Sociological Method.   As Ceri (1993: 164) writes, 
‘We have seen how Durkheim upholds the principle of the irrelevance of the content 
of beliefs. An analogous principle holds for sentiments, whose specific 
characteristics…he does not consider relevant.  It is not the specific content or 
reference of sentiments…that explains behaviour, but their intensity, as an 
expression of the moral state of the group.’  This would however contrast with the 
overall development of Durkheim’s thought towards the Elementary Forms of 
Religious Life, where the stress is increasingly on representations. (This prompted 
Parsons (1937: ) to suggest that he had gone ‘clean over into idealism’.)  Another 
interpretation would be simply that he felt he had been insufficiently precise: 
‘…since he bases his argument largely on the antithesis between the individual and 
society, the vehicles of organic solidarity are not dealt with in detail’ (Müller, 1993: 
100).  As Müller points out (107 n. 2) Durkheim remedies this deficiency with his 
preface on occupational groups in the second edition of Division of Labour.  
11
 This  somewhat coded title refers to the psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg’s model 
of moral development, best illustrated in its Habermasian reconstruction by means of 
the useful summary by Thomas McCarthy (1978) which I reproduced in my book on 
Habermas (Outhwaite 1994: 52-3).  
It should be noted that stage 7 is Habermas' addition to Kohlberg's six-stage model 
('Moral Development & Ego Identity', p.9O). Kohlberg's stage 6 focuses on individual 
conscience, whereas in Habermas' stage 7  'the principle of justification of norms is no 
longer the monologically applicable principle of generalizability but the communally 
followed procedure of redeeming normative validity claims discursively.'  Stages 5-6 
are postconventional, but incompletely so, in that they postulate conceptions of utility 
(stage 5) and principles and duties (stage 6) which themselves have to be relativised 
against one another in stage 7, where concrete moral dilemmas flow naturally into 
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metaethical discourses about conflicting fundamental principles.   It should be noted 
that stage 7 is Habermas' addition to Kohlberg's six-stage model ('Moral Development 
& Ego Identity', p.9O). Kohlberg's stage 6 focuses on individual conscience, whereas 
in Habermas' stage 7  'the principle of justification of norms is no longer the 
monologically applicable principle of generalizability but the communally followed 
procedure of redeeming normative validity claims discursively.' 
 
 
